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A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE?
JUDGE KOLLAR-KOTELLY'S VIEW
OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
TO REGULATE POLITICAL MONEY
Robert F. Baue;
I agree with those who argue that the district court has been un-
fairly savaged for its decision in McConnell v. EEC.' My reasons may,
however, differ significantly from those of others who have expressed
this view. For, as I see it, the problem lies more with the statute' than
with the district court's construction. If the statute represents-and I
believe that it does-some awkward compromises, then it's not sur-
prising that the lower court decision emerging from a review of the
statute would be somewhat awkward, and that it would take quite
some time for the court to express that awkwardness.
Now for some odd reason, the release of this opinion, which eve-
ryone understands will be superseded by the decision of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, has become the occasion of a massive legal spin war in
which each side tries to claim that it was victorious, while at the same
time insisting that the decision doesn't mean anything. Only in
Washington could such an argument take place. In my view, this was
not a very good day for the defendants, for the simple reason that the
larger share of the regulatory restrictions directed against the politi-
cal parties was struck down. And, I also believe that the so-called
"backup definition" for electioneering communications approved by
the court is, as a constitutional matter, exceptionally fragile, so that
over the long run, substituting this vaguer backup definition for the
thirty- to sixty-day bright-line test simply dooms that entire enterprise
to failure.
So far, much of the commentary has focused on the reasoning of
Judge Leon, as the "swing judge," but I would like to direct my re-
marks to the opinion of Judge Kollar-Kotelly. It is helpful when con-
sidering an opinion like this to examine the assumptions behind it
and then discuss the consequences of these assumptions for the fu-
ture of campaign finance regulation specifically. Such an analysis
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I McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), prob. juris. noted, 123
S. Ct. 2268 (2003) (mem.).
2 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA"), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
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certainly illuminates the choice that the Supreme Court will face as it
reviews this decision and decides which direction it wishes to take.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly created a very conscientious, comprehensive
framework for sustaining a statutory enactment of this kind-a far-
reaching effort to tighten and expand the regulation of political ac-
tivity.
Consider how Judge Kollar-Kotelly stresses the importance of
enormous deference, or, in Professor Briffault's words, "great re-
spect," to the decisions that Congress made in constructing this stat-
ute. And there are, of course, favorable citations in her opinion to
Justice Breyer, reflecting her favorable view of his position that we
need to presume Congress's expertise and hence concede its wide au-
thority to regulate political conduct. Judge Kollar-Kotelly takes the
Breyer view to something approaching breath-taking, but perhaps
also logical, lengths.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly's defense of congressional authority to regu-
late campaign finance ranges over both Title I and Title II of the
BCRA, encompassing restrictions on political parties, unions, and
corporations. First of all, she makes it very clear that there really is
not much effort required of Congress in establishing that any particu-
lar conduct presents the actuality or appearance of corruption. In
fact, in the Kollar-Kotelly view, a corruption showing is virtually
automatic: it is purchased, if you will, at the deepest discount. She
finds that corruption or its appearance is "inherently" in a system of
private donor financing:3 the actual activity of raising and spending
money has, in this sense, corruption embedded in it.
She periodically adds an element of purchase-of-access to her
analysis of the nature of this corruption.4 But then again, if one was
looking for some rigor in this corruption analysis, this reference to
the purchase-of-access will not satisfy the search: Judge Kollar-Kotelly
acknowledges that finding purchase-of-access is difficult. In her
words, the entire business of purchasing access is "subtle, less open to
verification, and therefore less likely to be captured by empirical re-
view."' So, while there are findings about access, she acknowledges
that we do not have to scratch hard at the surface of political life to
conclude that political contributions or expenditures purchase ac-
cess: it is part of the system, inherent in it.
This is significant, for it leaves Congress with little work to do in
extending the range of regulatory controls on the political process. It
need show very little, in real terms: the system is revealed to be self-
evidently corrupt. And even that feature of the system that may seem
3 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 664 (Kollar-KotellyJ.).
4 Id. at 497-98.
5 Id. at 672 n.162.
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intuitively plausible-that contributors buy access, if not votes-is
more assumed than established, even though the assumption is con-
ceded to be "less open to verification" or not easily "captured by em-
pirical review."
This type of claim is sometimes imagined to be consistent with the
constitutional framework established by Buckley v. Valeo,6 but it is not.
For the Supreme Court then had before it a statute designed to put
some effective limits on large contributions to candidates: the "sys-
tem of private donor financing" was then for all practical purposes
unregulated. So the Buckley Court identified an "abuse inherent in a
regime of large individual financial contributions"7 to candidates.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly casts her analysis far more broadly, finding that
the "abuse" infects the totality of a private financing regime, includ-
ing one operating under contribution limits and other regulatory
controls.
This is one significant part of the judge's constitutional jurispru-
dence. In another, with direct significance for the activities of non-
political organizations like corporations or unions, Judge Kollar-
Kotelly essentially claims that Congress may act to proscribe cam-
paign fund-raising and spending whenever the political activity under
review has some influence on federal elections. In some parts of her
opinion, she refers to "significant influence,"8 while, in other parts of
the opinion, she makes simple mention of "influence." In addition,
Congress may freely act to prevent an evasion or circumvention of the
core limits of the Federal Election Campaign Act.9 So Congress may
react to an activity with a hypothesized influence on elections-such
as we have seen recently in the case of issue advertising-and act (1)
to protect the integrity of the federal electoral process, or (2) to es-
tablish safeguards against loopholes or evasions of the existing statu-
tory scheme.
Two other features of the Kollar-Kotelly view stand out. One of
them, the most striking, lies in her analysis of the strict scrutiny re-
quirement that the means employed by Congress, in the protection
of its compelling interest, are narrowly tailored to achieve this end.'
Judge Kollar-Kotelly declares that Congress escapes the problem of
narrow tailoring by being very specific and clear about the conduct it
does not like. And it did so, for example, with the primary definition
in the electioneering communication provisions. There it identified
a certain kind of advertising that refers to federal candidates; the
6 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
7 Id. at 27.
8 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 639 (Kollar-Kotelly,J.).
9 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (2003).
10 See McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 656-57 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
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time period within which the advertisements would run, that is, thirty
days before a primary election and sixty days before a general elec-
tion; the medium over which it would be broadcast, i.e., cable broad-
cast satellite; and the target audience for the advertising.'1 So, in ef-
fect, narrow tailoring, which in the traditional jurisprudence is
designed to put some limits on congressional regulation of the politi-
cal process, now becomes an invitation for Congress to regulate ac-
tively and freely, so long as it is specific about the activity under at-
tack.
Where does that leave matters? Certainly Congress emerges from
this analysis with vast powers to regulate the political process-powers
barely bounded by meaningful speech or associational limitations. If
Congress identifies an activity with some influence on federal elec-
tions, concluding further that the activity implicates in some way the
corruption "inherent" in fundraising, or contributes in some way to
the erosion of statutory safeguards, it may act on the one condition
that it identifies that activity clearly. 2 But how clearly? BCRA does
not suggest all that high a level of clarity, and meaningful legislative
history is nowhere to be found. For while some of its provisions de-
lineate the activity that Congress sought to restrict, Congress did not
offer much in the way of explanation for its choices. There is no
"findings" section; and indeed, no Senate report or conference re-
port in the statute. Under the view expounded by Judge Kollar-
Kotelly, Congress need do no more, because all of the necessary work
has been done beforehand, enshrined in a constitutional doctrine
that assumes "corruption" that is "inherent" in the private financing
of elections and that Congress possesses broad powers to attack.
As stated to this point, this may seem a powerful claim, but it turns
out to be even more potent. For in the jurisprudence I am outlining,
Congress may not only act on the basis of learned experience, but
also prospectively-looking in advance to political activities that may
happen and, if they occurred, would endanger its statutory scheme.
In her words, Congress may "exercise latitude in forming predictive
judgments about possible evasion and circumvention of the law and is
able to act accordingly.' 3 How remarkable! Some people have trou-
ble enough with the predictive judgments that Congress makes, for
example, in fashioning fiscal policy. There is no reason for skeptics
to take more comfort in predictive judgments that Congress may
i 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (3)(A).
12 Judge Kollar-Kotelly also cites the broad congressional authority to attack the "appearance
of corruption." McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 685 (Kollar-Kotelly,J.). While I do not have the
time to address that concern here, particularly because this concern with "appearances" is old
news, it is still worthy of continuing attention. That the government has wide-ranging authority
to regulate politics in the name of "appearances" should never be taken lightly.
13 Id. at 665.
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make about "dangerous" political activities. As a practical example,
Judge Kollar-Kotelly sanctions on this theory the way that Congress
developed the thirty- and sixty-day preelection issue advertising pro-
hibitions. She upholds Congress's right to assess an organization's
"actual intent" behind the ads, with such an assessment being
grounded in the nature of the issues covered in their advertisements,
among the other relevant facts and circumstances.
This is a most expansive view of what Congress may do to regulate
the raising and spending of political money in the United States. It is
a very elaborated version of what we've heard from Justice Breyer.
And one might ask: how does she-or for that matter, Justice
Breyer-get to this point? After all, not too long ago, Congress was
thought unfit, because it was too self-interested, to be entrusted with
campaign finance reform; and for this reason, some suggested that it
give up the responsibility altogether, passing it on to some institution
akin to a military base closing commission that would produce a
statutory proposal for an "up or down" vote without amendment.
Something in the meantime has changed, making it plausible for a
jurist such asJudge Kollar-Kotelly, following Justice Breyer, to offer so
deferential a view of Congress's authority to engineer the rules for
campaign finance.
No doubt the answer lies in part in the result of recent reform de-
liberations: now that Congress has passed a bill to their liking, pro-
ponents of reform are prepared to stand up for Congress's authority
to do so. But there is more, and we can perhaps find it in Judge Kol-
lar-Kotelly's conclusion, where she quotes the dissenting opinion of
Justice Byron White in Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley: "Every
form of regulation-from taxes to compulsory bargaining-has some
effect on the ability of individuals and corporations to engage in ex-
pressive activity." 4 The only question for Congress is the permissible
"extent" of the restriction.' Notice in that citation the reference to
taxes and compulsory bargaining: it makes clear that the standard
crafted by Judge Kollar-Kotelly places Congress's power to regulate
political activity, and the associated speech and associational issues,
on the same plane as regulatory activities directed toward entirely dif-
ferent regulatory concerns: taxes, compulsory bargaining, environ-
mental regulation, defense, and so forth.
So bit by bit, in this view, the courts may relocate campaign fi-
nance to the periphery of the privileged domain of First Amendment
analysis, and lay it along side any number of other "regulatory prob-
lems" over which Congress has extraordinarily expansive authority.
1I d. at 708 (quoting Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 310
(1981) (White,J., dissenting)).
15 Id.
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This is a sea of change in our view of the power of Congress over the
political process, and I would suggest it warrants closer attention than
it has received.
